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Originally, the following text was part of a projector presentation. For easier readability, the slide 
transitions were removed, and it was rendered into PDF/A. A better version in can be accessed under: 
http://durt.info/2011Summer/2011_Christoph_Durt%27s_DGPhil_presentation.html 
 
DGPhil congress 2011: The World of Reasons 
1. reasons necessitate a common background, and our picture of the world is an 
important part of it 
2. reflection on the logical and historical origin of our picture of the world can 
contribute to elucidate the structure of a number of philosophical forms of 
reasoning  
3. one important line of thought in modern philosophy pretends that the 
philosopher can abstract from such presuppositions 
"[...] for all opinions I had held until then, I thought that I could not do better 
than resolve at once to sweep them wholly away [...]" 
(Descartes, Discours de la Méthode, Partie II. All translations are mine unless 
otherwise noted.)  
2 
 
"I will now close my eyes, I will stop my ears, I will turn away my senses 
from their objects […] thus, holding converse only with myself, and closely 
examining my nature, I will endeavor to obtain by degrees a more intimate 
and familiar knowledge of myself." 
(Descartes, Meditatio III, 1, translated by John Veitch) 
4. university teaching today usually buys into the story of a new start by 
Descartes, in particular with respect to "modern" philosophical problems; if 
not explicitly then practically (e.g. in explaining problems in philosophy of 
mind, subjectivity, the external world) 
 
This presentation tries to show: 
1. a central modification of modern philosophy concerns the structure of the 
world itself; "Galileo's mathematization of nature" (Husserl) breaks with 
Scholastic philosophy, and it is presupposed by modern philosophers such as 
Descartes and Locke  
2. the mathematization of nature stands behind important "modern" forms of 
reasoning, such as the distinction between "primary" and "secondary" 
qualities, and connected problems (e.g. consciousness, the perceiver, 
subjectivity) 
 
A curious form of reasoning 
"I think that if ears, tongues, and noses were removed, shapes and numbers and 
motions would remain, but not odors or tastes or sounds. I believe that outside of 
the living being the latter are no more than names, just as tickling and titillation are 
nothing but names if we removed the armpits and the skin inside the nose." 
(Galileo Il Saggiatore [1623])  
"[…] we first exclude hardness, since if the stone is melted or pulverized in its most 
minute parts it loses its hardness without thereby ceasing to be a body; next we 
exclude color, since we have often seen stones so transparent as to lack color; next 
we exclude heaviness, since although fire is extremely light it is still thought of as 
being corporeal; and finally we exclude cold and heat and all other such qualities, 
either because they are not thought of as being in the stone, or because if they 
change, the stone is not therefore considered as having lost its bodily nature. We 
thus see that nothing remains in the idea of the stone except that what is extended in 
length, breadth and depth." 
(Descartes Principia Philosophiæ [1644], II, 11) 
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"Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see light or colours, nor the ears 
hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell; and all colours, tastes, 
odours, and sounds, as they are such particular ideas, vanish and cease, and are 
reduced to their causes, i.e. bulk, figure, and motion of parts." 
(Locke Essay [1689], II, viii, 18) 
 
Galileo Galilei (1623) 
The Assayer  
"Philosophy is written in 
this grand book that is 
continually open before 
our eyes (I mean the 
universe), but it cannot be 
understood unless one 
first learns to understand 
the language and knows 
the characters in which it 
is written. It is written in 
mathematical language, 
and its characters are 
triangles, circles, and other 
geometrical figures, 
without which it is 
humanly impossible to 
understand a word of it; 
without these, one is 
wandering around in vain 
in a dark labyrinth."  
(Galileo Il Saggiatore 
[1623], 
http://www.liberliber.it/
mediateca/libri/g/galilei
/il_saggiatore/html/06.ht
m) 
 
Qualities that are really part of the objects they are attributed to 
Galileo: 
 extension 
 location 
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 mass 
 motion 
 shape 
 size 
 penetration 
 touch 
 number 
 →directly mathematizable (technique of mapping as if measurements were 
taken in ideal space) 
 Galileo's notion radicalized by Descartes:  
"The nature of body consists not in weight, hardness, color, or the like, 
but in extension alone." 
(Descartes Principia Philosophiæ [1644], II, §4) 
 
Qualities that are not really part of the objects they are attributed to 
Galileo: 
 colors 
 tastes 
 odors 
 sounds 
 heat 
 tickling/titillation 
 →not directly mathematizable 
 "must" be indirectly mathematizable (via "primary" qualities — and in 
relation to a "standard" observer) 
 
The "Corpo Sensitivo" and the problem of the observer 
 corpo sensitivo, corpo animato, corpo animato e sensitivo 
 l'animale, l'animal vivente 
 l'anima sensitiva 
"[...] I think that tastes, odors, colors, and so on are no more than mere names so far 
as the object in which we place them is concerned, and that they reside only in the 
consciousness. Hence if the living creature were removed, all these qualities would 
be wiped away and annihilated. But since we have imposed upon them special 
names, distinct from those of the other and real qualities mentioned previously, we 
wish to believe that they really exist as actually different from those."  
(translation by: Stillman Drake Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo (1957), 274) 
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"[…] vo io pensando che questi sapori, odori, colori, etc., per la parte del suggetto nel 
quale ci par che riseggano, non sieno altro che puri nomi, ma tengano solamente lor 
residenza nel corpo sensitivo, sì che rimosso l'animale, sieno levate ed annichilate 
tutte queste qualità; tuttavolta però che noi, sì come gli abbiamo imposti nomi 
particolari e differenti da quelli de gli altri primi e reali accidenti, volessimo credere 
ch'esse ancora fussero veramente e realmente da quelli diverse." 
(Galilei Il Saggiatore [1623], http://it.wikisource.org/wiki/Il_Saggiatore, chapter 48) 
"[…] I think that tastes, odors, colors, and so on, on part of the subject in which they 
appear to reside, are no more than mere names, but that they hold their residency 
only in the sensitive body. Hence, if the animal were removed, all these qualities 
would be wiped away and annihilated. Nevertheless, as soon as we in this way have 
imposed names on them, particular and different from those of the other primary 
and real accidents, we want to believe that they also exist just as truly and really as 
the latter." 
(less misleading translation) 
 
The problem of the status of merely apparent qualities – Error Theory, 
Dispositionalism 
"[…] pain and color and so on are clearly and distinctly perceived when they are 
regarded merely as sensations or thoughts. But when they are judged to be real 
things existing outside our mind, there is no way of understanding what sort of 
things they are." 
(Descartes Principia Philosophiæ, [1644], I, 68) 
 
(Locke Essay [1690], II, viii, 15) 
 
